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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH

LUCILE M. HALE, an Individual,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
vs.

case No. 15771

RALPH FRAKES, an Individual,
Defendant-Respondent,

BRIEF OF PLAINTJFF-APPELLANT
NATURE OF THE CASE
This is an appeal from a decision which found no cause
of action in Plaintiff-Appellant's complaint alleging
boundary by acquiescence.
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
The District Court of the First Judicial District in
and for the county of Box Elder dismissed PlaintiffAppe llant' s Complaint upon a finding of no cause of action.
The complaint asked for damages and injunctive relief requiring Defendant-Respondent to replace an old fence line
and also ordering Defendant-Respondent from further preventing or interfering in any manner with PlaintiffAppellant' s use of said real property.
grounded on

th~

The Complaint was

theory of boundary by acquiescence and ad-

verse possession.

The District court focused on the former

as shall
this
brief.
Sponsored bytheory
the S.J. Quinney
Law Library.
Funding
for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Service
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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The court in

a memorandum decision found that there

was no acqd.P.sence and dismissed the Complaint with prejudice.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Plaintiff-Appellant seeks reversal of the District
Court of instructions sufficient to direct the District
court to enter judgment in favor of Plaintiff-Appellant,
to grant the injunctive relief sought in the Complaint,
and to award damages as the District Court deems proper
FACTS FOUND UPON THE RECORD (R)
AND
THE REPORTER'S TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS (T)
FACT SUMMARY
A strong fence built long ago stood upon certain
property.

Neither Plaintiff-Appellant's living predecessors

in title nor Defendant-Respondent's living predecessors in
title can remember when the fence came into existence, or
when an even older fence built in the same place was erected.
On or about May 18, 1973, Plaintiff-Appellant purchased the
land north of the fence and suosequent to that DefendantRespondent purchased the land south of the fence.

Then in

1974, without prior warning, the Defendant-Respondent uprooted the ancient monument which had divided the two
properties for over forty years.

This dispute concerns only
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that certain strip of land which lies between what is now
found to be tne true boundary of Section 14 by a survey
made after the rence was removed and the fence line.

The

following free hand sketch is a diagram of the disputed area.
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ANNOTATED FACTS:
Respondent's witness, Mr. John Newman, testified at
trial that he is the predecessor in title to Respondent and
held title to the disputed land now found to be in Section
23 (T-120).

Mr. Newman first became familiar with the

disputed fence line in 1933 when he was assigned the task of
rennovating an older fence (T-139).

Though he testified

that the fence was built only to control livestock and that
he considered the fence to be off the property line (T-50),
he admitted that, despite his awareness of a boundary
dispute, he constructed the fence precisely over the other
fence (T-155).

Since that time he admitted that he has

never disputed nor interferred in the exclusive use of the
property north of the fence by Appellant nor her predecessors in title (T-152).

But he claims to have maintained to

neighbors that he always considered the fence to be off his
true boundary line (T-137).

There was no substantiating

testimony to that effect.
The testimony of Orval Peterson, brother of Ronald
Peterson who is Appellant's irrunediate predecessor, testified
that from the time he was a little boy working for his
father the fence was there (T-37) and family operations were
always carried on right up to the fence (T-38).

Orval did

not personally remember there being a dispute regarding the
fence as the boundary line (T45).

He did recall, though,

that a predecessor, A. E. Roche, had had some trouble and

4
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lost some land back in the twenties, but the testimony is
very sparse as to details (T-43).

He always considered the

fence to be the boundary line, and though it may have been
built for the additional purpose of holding cattle (T-43),
he always farmed right to the fence (T-44).
Dennis Larkin, another farmer in the area, confirmed
that the fence was of ancient origin, and he personally
knew that the fence had been there for at least thirtyfive (35) years (T-47).
A survey was made in 1974 by the County Surveyor after
Respondent had removed the disputed fence, and it revealed
that the fence was some thirty-three (33) feet south of the
line which the survey ascertained to be the true line between
Sections 14 and 23.

The survey was performed to locate the

section corner of Sections 14, 15, 22 and 23 at the request
of another engineer-surveyor from Tremonton, Utah.

The County

Surveyor testified that because original monuments are necessary to establish a corner and "make it authentic and legal"
(T-100) , he looked for a monument where all now know that
Sections 14, 15, 22 and 23 meet, but could not find the monument because the spot lies in the middle of a county road (T-llC
He also testified that a land owner would not have found a
marker, either; like himself, the landowner would have to
establish one (T-110).
The witness explained the difficult labors he went
through to locate the corner.

He found a marker stone one

mile directly west of the disputed corner, another rock one
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mile south of the corner lying on the ground in disoriented
fashion (T-102) , and another large stone one mile east of
the disputed corner, which stone was large, irregularly
placed and covered with mud (T-103).

He did not find a

monument to the north of the disputed corner and concluded
that it had probably been obliterated for many years (T-103).
After locating the stones which served as monuments, he proceeded to check out his measurements by "tying down the
fences", meaning, he started measuring distances in accordance
with where the people had established boundaries themselves
through the use of fences (T-104); but, he added that no
consideration is given to roads or ditches in determining
section corners (T-117).

After a series of measurements, he

put his information together (T-104), and using his best
judgment as a surveyor and his authority as the County
Surveyor (T-114), he marked the section corner.
The disputed fence line was about thirty-three (33)
feet south of what the County Surveyor determined to be the
true boundary.

The surveyor did not use the disputed fence

as a reference point from which to work when he "tied down
the fences" but testified that he would have used it had it
existed (T-112).

He further states that the disputed fence's

location would not have changed his ultimate decision; he
would have taken the fence to be the south side of the right
of way (T-113).
He did not testify as to how he deduced that a right

6
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of way existed; there are no easements or records on the
land in dispute in either Section 23 or Section 14.
(R-Defendant's Exhibit No. 11, Plaintiff's Exhibits Nos. 5,
6, and 7).
Several items in Plaintiff-Appellant's abstract conspicuously evidence a right of way for road along the
western boundaries of her land.

There are none which show

easements or rights of way along the southern boundary
though there are deeds containing boilerplate that the
conveyance is subject to easements and rights of way of
record.

There is one irregularity in the chains of title,

though.

In Plaintiff's Exhibit No. 5, Item No. 10,.there is

an Affidavit by A. E. Roche by which he reaffirms that he
never owned an interest in land in Section 23; this is dated
May 26, 1954 and refers to the May 24, 1926 Quit Claim Deed,
which is Plaintiff's Exhibit No. 7, Item No. 17, in which
Roche quit claimed to a strip of land in Section 23.

Both

of these documents refer to land in Section 23 and do not
speak of easements in Section 14.
The physical features of the surrounding area offer no
strong clue that the fence had been mislocated.

There were

no survey monuments which were readily visible from which to
start measurements.

The fence line lined up well with the

south side of a county road to the west which ran east and
west (R-Plaintiff's Exhibit No. 4).

A road and ditch of

Defendant-Respondent were located south of the disputed fence
line.
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ARGUMENT
POINT I
A CLAIM TO LAND UNDER THE DOCTRINE OF BOUNDARY BY
ACQUIESCENCE REQUIRES THAT THE CLAIMING PARTY ESTABLISH
r''JUR ELF"·!l!:NTS:
(A) THE LINE MUST BE OPEN, VISIBLE AND
1'1ARKED BL MONUMENTS, FENCES OR BUILDINGS, (B) MUTUAL
ACQUIESCENCE IN THE LINE AS THE BOUNDARY, (C) FOR A
LONG PERIOD OF YEARS, (D) BY ADJOINING LANDOWNERS.
ESTABLISHMENT OF ALL FOUR ELEMENTS CREATES THE PRESUMPTION OF A LEGALLY BINDING AGREEMENT AS TO THE
BOUNDARY, WHICH PRESUMPTION MUST BE OVERCOME BY SPECIFIC
EVIDENCE THAT THERE WAS NO AGREEMENT.
HOLMES V. JUDGE,
31 U. 269, 87 P. 1009 (1906), TRIPP V. BAGLEY, 74 U.
57 I 276 P. 912 (1928).
A. THE LINE MUST BE OPEN, VISIBLE, AND MARKED BY
MONUMENTS, FENCES OR BUILDINGS.
This requirement of an open, visible and well marked
boundary finds its roots in the early landmark cases which
established the doctrine of boundary by acquiescence. Holmes
v. Judge, supra, Brown v. Milliner, 120

u.

16, 232 P.2d 202

(1951). The requirement that the boundary be open, visible
or well-marked by monuments is a method of testing whether
the claimant's to disputed land have reasonably believed
that such monuments are the actual boundaries of their land.
When the Court finds that no one could reasonably believe
that a particular line was the boundary, the doctrine of
boundary by acquiescence is denied.
supra.

Tripp v. Bagley,

The Court in Tripp found that the claimed boundary

line, a zig zag fence built upon the prairie, could not
possibly have been regarded as the boundary by reasonable
men.

But reasonableness is determined from the circum-

stances of each case as Baum v. Defa, 525 P.2d 725 (1974)
makes clear.

In Baum, the Court noted that even a zig zag
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line can be the boundary of land acquired by acquiescence,
especially if it is tied to natural monuments as it was in
Baum.
The facts of the instant controversy satisfy this first
requirement.

The disputed boundary had been marked by an

ancient fence whose origin dates past the memory of any of
the disputants or their predecessors in title.
The trial court found that reliance on the ancient
fence was not justified.

In his memorandum decision, the

Court stated that "the section lines can be determined with
very little effort" and that it was obvious from the surrounding fences that the disputed fence encroaches,two (2) rods
onto Respondent's property.

These conclusions of the Court

come and can come only after having had the benefit of the
testimony of several witnesses, especially the testimony of
the County Surveyor.

But Appellant's had no such testimony

nor schooling in surveying with which to locate their boundaries.

The testimony at trial, expecially that of the County

Surveyor, shows that reliance on the existing fences as boundary markers is not unreasonable.

The County Surveyor testified

that even if Appellant had looked for a section corner monument, she would not have found one but would have had to
establish one as he did.

He testified that in establishing

such a corner he presumes the fences to make property boundaries, and it is from this presumption that he operates in
taking measurements to interpelate the correct location of
markers.

Such interpelation was possible only after the
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County Surveyor had searched for and found only three of four
markers, two of which where ordinary stones found lying on the
ground, all at least a mile from the disputed corner.
T'

~

cross ·. "<amination of Appellant by Respondent's

attorney at trial attempted to show that Appellant had failed
to heed the legal description of the deed by which she claimed
title to her land.

Apparently, the thrust of his cross exam-

ination was that all, no matter what the circumstances may be,
should be held to a duty to locate boundaries with the knowledge
of surveyors, and that that knowledge would have immediately
alerted Appellant and all others like her to the fact that,
despite an ancient fence line, the true boundary was some thirty·
three (33) feet north of the fence line.
To require conduct consistant with such high levels of
knowledge is too much.

This fact is apparent when it is

realized that the County Surveyor performed his task of locating the section corner at the request of another engineersurveyor who lived in a nearby town.

The other surveyor needed

the section corner in order to start his survey.

Knowledge

rising to the level of a surveyor's surveyor is an unreasonable requirement to make of land owners, especially when a
fence has stood on the presumed boundaries for longer than any
living soul can rereember.
Further, nothing in the three chains of title through
which Appellant holds title to her land can be construed as
notice to her that the fence line could not reasonably be her
boundary.

The deeds make specific mention of a right of way

imposed
onFunding
the for
west
sideprovided
of the
Sponsored for
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reference to a right of way for road along the southern
boundary is conspicuously missing from deeds affecting the
southern boundary.

Such conspicuous absence of a right of

way for road in light of the conspicuous presence of a right
of way for road creates a strong, justified impression that
rights of way to the south do not exist and there are no
problems regarding the boundary.

Respondent's whole argu-

ment is that Appellant knew the fence line was off the true
boundary to provide for a right of way for a road which was
to be built.

Neither Appellant nor her predecessors had

actual or constructive knowledge of such a right of-way, and
it strains the limits of reasonableness for Respondent to claim
that he has waited and is now still waiting for a road which
has been over forty years in coming.
There are two irregularities which appear in Appellant's
abstracts which consist of an Affidavit and a Quit Claim
evidencing that A. E. Roche, a predecessor of Appellant, relinquished his claim to land in Section 23.

That dispute

occurred in the 1920's at a time when none of the witnesses
who are predecessors in title here would have had first hand,
clear knowledge of the nature of the dispute.

In addition,

the Quit Claim Deed and Affidavit become meaningful only if
the true boundary to Section 23 was known to the relevant
parties.

Because section lines do not exist in nature on the

face of the land, it would be only reasonable for Appellant
and her predecessors in title to even more confidently assume
that, though there was once a dispute to the boundary line,
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated11
OCR, may contain errors.

that that dispute had been settled and the fence stood as a
memorial of its settlement.

It is not reasonable to assume

that after a victory in a dispute over one's own boundaries
that the victor would then rebuild the fence upon the exact
line which marked the claim of the other's encroachment.
B. THERE MUST BE MUTUAL ACQUIESCENCE IN THE LINE
AS THE BOUNDARY.
The name of the doctrine suggests that there must be
some sort of dispute or controversy or uncertainty as to the
true location of the boundary.

Tripp v. Bagley, supra.

Were it not so, one party could not acquiesce or give in to
the assertions of another.

The requirement of dispute or

uncertainty is often implied as a matter of law as the Utah
Courts have made clear.
"In some of the opinions of this Court on the
subject of disputed boundaries, there are statements to the effect that the location of the true
boundary must be uncertain, unknown or in dispute
before an agreement between the adjoining land
owners fixing the boundary will be upheld, citing
Tripp v. Bagley, supra, in support thereof. Such
statements should be understood to mean that if
the location of the true boundary line is known
to the adjoining owners, they cannot by parol
agreement establish the boundary elsewhere. As
was poin~ed out in the Tripp case, such an agreement would be in contravention of the statute of
frauds. But the Tripp case does not require a party
relying upon a boundary which has been acquiesced
in for a long period of time to produce evidence that
the location of the true boundary was ever unknown,
uncertain or in dispute. That the true boundary line
was uncertain or in dispute and that the parties
agreed upon the recognized boundary as the dividing
line will be impljed from the parties' long acquiescence. 0 (Brown v. Milliner, supra, at 208).
The implication by law of a dispute or uncertain
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boundary may or may not be needed in the instant case because Respondent's witness and predecessor testified that he
thought there was an actual dispute clear back in 1933 when
he first became acquainted with the fence.

During cross

examination he admitted that though he thought there was a
dispute as to the fence's location that went back in time for
two generations, he built a new fence over an even older fence
whose creation dated back at least through the thirties.
Further, since the time of his construction of the fence he
admitted that he did in fact acquiesce in the use of the land
on the north side of the fence from 1933, and that since 1933
he never disputed nor interfered with the exclusive use of
the property by his neighbors.
Respondent maintains, though, that he never agreed to
nor intended the fence to be or become a boundary line, but
that he has always considered the fence to be a barrier to
animals and nothing more.

In Brown, though, the Court clarifies

that the doctrine of boundary by acquiesence does not require
an express agreement as to the fence as the boundary.
"We have further held in this state that in the
absence of evidence that the owners of adjoining
property or their predecessors in title ever expressly agieed as to the location of the boundary
between them, if they have occupied their respective boundaries up to an open boundary line visibly marked by monuments, fences or buildings for
a long period of time and mutually recognized it
as the dividing line between them, the law will
imply an agreement fixing the boundary as located,
if it can do so consistently with the facts appearing and will not permit the parties nor their
gra~tees to depart from such line. Holmes v. Judge,
31 u. 269, 87 Pac. 1009." (~,supra, at 204}.
13
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In the later case of liumrnel v. Yuung, l U

~rl

2:17, ?65

P.2d 410 (1953) the Court restates the Brown rule that even
if there is no proof of agreement of the fence as the boundary,
such agreement will be implied by law if the boundary was
clear, visible and marked by monuments and mutually recognized
as the dividing line if the facts allow a reasonable reference
of agreement.

In Hummel such a reasonable inference of

agreement was not found from the factual situation.

Justices

Wade and Crockett wrote interesting concurrences in that
case.
" ... The talk of an agreement is merely the legal
or roundabout method used by the Courts in holding
that acquiescence alone is sufficient and it is
immaterial whether such an agreement was ever
reached. To that effect is Holmes v. Judge, one
of our earliest and most carefully considered
cases .... We quoted with approval from Baldwin
v. Brown, [16 N.U. 359, at page 363) as follows:

* * * The acquiescence in such cases
affords ground, not merely for an inference of fact to go to the jury as
evidence of an original parol agreement, but for a direct legal inference
as to the true boundary line * * * .
[Emphasis in original) .
This quotation clearly holds ... that the true boundary
line will be inferred ... as a matter of law, and that
evidence that there was no agreement is inadmissible
because it is i_mmaterial.
(Hummel v. Young, supra,
at 413). "
In Hummel and the later case of
2

u.

Ri~gwood

v. Bradford,

2d 119, 269 P.2d 1053 (1954) the Court recognizes that

there are certain situations where the law will allow the
If the parties knew that the

presumption to be rebutted.

line they acquiesced in was not the true boundary line or if
they temporarily set a boundary with the express understanf ing
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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the line was acquiesced in by mistake, the presumption will
not hold.

But both cases make it clear that the mere proof

of a lack of agreement is not alone sufficient to rebut the
presumption.
In the instant case the facts reasonably allow the presumption of the law to stand.

Relying heavily upon Wright

v. Clissold, 521 P.2d 1224 (1974) Respondent argues that the
fence was built entirely for the control of animals and not
built to settle a boundary dispute; he argues that Wright is
exactly the same as the instant case.

Respondent's reliance

upon the Wright case stems primarily from that case's discussion between fences built as animal barriers and fences
built to settle boundaries.

Apparently Respondent feels

that this fact would put his case into one of the exceptions
recognized in Hummel and Ringwood.

Respondent's attorney

elicited testimony that the fence was built solely as an
animal barrier and not as a boundary division.

But the

facts involved in Wright are substantially different from
those here.

In Wright though the fence line dated back to

1933, it appears that before its purchase by Defendant in
1946 (Defendant is claiming the land by asserting acquiescence)
the fence was used only to hold cattle and did not serve as
a division between adjoining land owners simply because
there were no neighbors whose boundaries had to be defined.
Whereas, for as far back as memory goes, the fence in the
instant case has been relied on as a boundary line.

Two

years after his purchase the Defendant in Wright was advised
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that the fence was not the boundary and after his attempt to
buy the

di~puted

parcel failed, Defendant continued in his

use of the land for only another twenty (20) years before
suit was brought.

This was a much shorter period than is

involved in the instant dispute.

There was even testimony

at trial that the Defendant in Wright once admitted in 1962
that he did not own the disputed parcel and that he used it
on the owner's permission; while here, Appellant never made
such a confession but has always maintained that she owned
to the fence.
Further, in Appellant's research, the only case which
ever cites Wright v. Clissold is the case of Baum v. Defa,
525 P.2d 725 (1974).

In Baum the Court refers to the Wright

holding regarding fences built solely as animal barriers and
then adds an important clarification that fences built
initially as animal barriers may later become property
division lines.
non the other hand, if the property on either
side of such a fence is conveyed to separate
parties, so that there comes into being
separate ownership of the tracts on either
side, and the circumstances are such that the
parties should reasonably be assumed to adopt
the fence as the boundary between their properties, then from that time on, the time
during which the fence continues to exist,
should be regarded as going toward the fulfilling the time requirement for the establishment of boundary by acquiescence.n
(Baum, supra, at 727).
In Baum the separate ownership of properties on each
side of the fence continued for only twenty-six (26) years
and involved a zig zag fence, but the Court still found that
a boundary by acquiescence had been created.

In the instant
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case, ownership has been for a much longer time and the
fence is straight and easily presumed from t·1e circumstances
existent at the time that the respective property owners
started using the fence as a division line to be the division
between Sections 13 and 14.
The 1974 Baum case in which Justice Crockett was joined
by Chief Justice Callister and Justices Henroid, Ellet, and
Tuckett relied heavily upon the policy which undergirds the
doctrine.
"The doctrine of boundary by acquiescence derives
from realization, ancient in our law, that the
peace and good order of society is best served
by leaving at rest possible disputes over long
established boundaries.
Its essence is that
where there has been any type of recognizable
physical boundary, which has been accepted as
such for a long period of time, it should be
presumed that any dispute or disagreement has
been reconciled in some manner."
{Baum, supra,
at 726).
In summary of this element, it is established from the
evidence that the fence stood for over forty years and
served as the division between the adjoining properties.
Respondent's predecessor admitted that he has never interfered with Appellant's use of the land, and Appellant and
her predecessors testified that they always used the land
right to the fence as their own; though the fence may have
been constructed to hold animals, it has since served as the
recognized division between the two properties for over
forty years.
C.

THE FENCES MUST STAND FOR A LONG PERIOD OF YEARS.

The laws requires the existence of the division line for
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agreement.

The period required will depend on the circum-

stances, but unless unusual circumstances exist, twenty years
is usually considered the minimum.
Corp, 530 P.2d 792 (1975).

Hobson v. Panguitch Lake

In Baum v. Defa, supra, the Court

found that a period of twenty-six (26) years was enough.

As

has been pointed out before, the fence line in the instant
dispute is over forty (40) years old.
D. THE DIVISION LINE MUST EXIST BETWEEN ADJOINING
LANDOWNERS.
The fourth requirement in establishing a boundary by
acquiescence requires that the division line must exist between adjoining landowners.

Whether the adjoining landowners

must establish the entirety of the long holding period themselves or whether present landowners may "tack" the period of
possession of their predecessors in title has never been clearly
decided in Utah on the doctrine of boundary by acquiescence,
though it is clear for adverse possession.
The doctrine of boundary by acquiescence is quite similar
to U.C.A. 78-12-10, adverse possession "under claim not founded
on written instrument or judgment" and the rule of tacking
should follow the adverse possession rule.

In fact, the

annotations to that section include a heading labeled "Boundary
by Acquiescence" .
The Utah Courts follow the general rule requiring privity
between those who wish to tack holding periods.

In Homeowner's

Loan Corporation v. Dudley, 105 U. 208, 141 P.2d 160 (1943),
the Court at 168 cites the A.L.R. annotation.

At 46 A.L.R.

792 - 799 the general rule is "that a deed does not of itself
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create privity between the grantor and the grantee as to land
not described in the deed, but occupied by the grantor in
connection therewith, although the grantee enters into possession of tha land not described and uses it in connection with
that conveyed".

In the instant case, the land which Appellant

now claims is technically land not found

with!~

the deed's

description and thus, at first blush, it appears that Appellant
will not be allowed the benefit of the long period of continuous
holding of her predecessors.

But this rule does not apply here.

This is because the deed description by itself is not adequate
to locate the property boundaries unless those boundaries are
marked by something:

Section lines do not appear in nature

upon the face of the earth.

Appellant and her predecessors

reasonably and naturally assumed that their deed's descriptions
conveyed property which ran right up to the fence which they
thought marked the southern boundary of Section 14.

The A.L.R.

annotation recognizes this situation and at 793 the limitations
to the general rule is outlined.
"The foregoing rule is very strictly limited (see
the following subdivision of this annotation), and,
while broader language may be found in some cases,
it is apparently applicable to those cases only
wherein the deed itself is relied on solely to
create privi~y, and there is no circumstance showing an intent to transfer the possession of any
property beyond the calls of the deed."
At 797 the annotation quotes Naher v. Farmer, 60 Wash.

nOO, 111 P. 768 (1910) which illustrates the well-recognized
limitation and allows tacking of a predecessor's holding period.
"While it is true that the deeds which passed
title to the successive owners described only
Lot 4, there was nothing to indicate the boundariesLawof
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from the time of the purchase by Mr. Broughton
in 1898 down to the time of this action, believed
that Lot 4 was the tract of land within the enclosure, and possession of the enclosed premises
was held openly and exclusively, and the conveyances made thereof as Lot 4. Under these circumstances the description in the deed must be held
to include the land in dispute."
The Court here is asked to authoritatively adopt the
same line of reasoning it has applied to adverse possession
to the doctrine of boundary by acquiescence.
seems to have been applied in the

14 U.2d 135, 378 P.2d 893 (1963).

l~63

Such reasoning

case of King v. Fronk,

In that case the same

District Court as the District Court in the instant case held
that the proof did not justify the claim by acquiescence to
the disputed land.

The Supreme Court reversed the District

Court and granted the land to the claiming party, but neither
Court ruled directly on the issue of tacking.

The claiming

party had not held the land for over twenty (20) years, but
was still in the process of purchasing it under contract from
one who acquired the land in 1945, which period is only sixteen

(16) years to the date of the first protest by the acquiescing
party in 1961.

In 1961, the acquiescing party had held the

land personally for thirteen (13) years.

The Court there

reviews cases which discuss the length of period needed to
create the presumption and states that " ... it seems to us that
establishment of boundary by acquiescence must be predicated
upon the existence of a visibly monumented line persisting
for at least twenty (20) years or upwards ..• (King, supra, at

897)".

The Court in King required at least twenty (20) years,

but the disputants had held the land personally for less than
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that period, though their chains of title went back for thirtyfive (35) years.

King tacitly permitted tacking, but a defini-

tive statement in the instant case on the issue of tacking will
do much to clarify the requirements of the doctrine of boundary
by acquiescence.
CONCLUSION
The elements required to establish as a matter of legal
implication a boundary by acquiescence were all clearly present
and undisputed here.

The fence line had been a

(1) visible

monument which (2) Respondent and his predecessors allowed to
stand as the property division line (3) for a period of at
least forty (40) years (4) between their interests and those
of Appellant and her predecessors.
The legal presumption was established at trial, and as
a matter of law the lower Court should have ruled in Appellant's
favor.

Appellant hereby prays for a reversal of the lower

decision which was clearly against the evidence.
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